median shortfall in the range of 32 to 37 percent.4 These data are consistent with Nickell's more sophisticated analysis of the ratio of actual posttax income to potential post-tax income for households in which the male was out of work (Nickell and Metcalf 1977) . Nickell found that, after taking account of all benefits and tax refunds, the average shortfall of household income was 28 percent for a 1972 sample of the unemployed.
The alleged disincentives toward job seeking provided by earnings-related supplementary unemployment benefits notwithstanding,' it is not surprising that in the GHS survey, 71 percent of all respondents seeking work considered unemployment a "very bad" or "quite bad" experience; the most important reasons were economic hardship ("lack of money") or psychological dis-
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tress ("depression" and "boredom") or both.6 Given the social incidence and economic impact of joblessness, it follows that rising unemployment accentuates inequality. The shortcomings of the available data make it more difficult to draw firm conclusions about the impact of inflation on the economic well-being of various groups in Britain. It is clear from data on the cyclical behavior of factor shares (that is, shares of national income going to labor versus capital over the business cycle), that the wage and salary share of national income is not eroded by inflation. Indeed, gross corporate profits appear to suffer relative declines during periods of rising prices (Hibbs 1975) . Similarly, investment yields have generally not kept pace with inflation, thereby disadvantaging the rich and others dependent on unearned income in Britain (Piachaud 1978 ). Piachaud's data also indicate that the heaviest burden of inflation-induced increases in direct taxation rates, which until 1978 were not formally indexed and are based on progressive nominal schedules, has fallen on upper (and to a lesser degree lower) income groups.
Studies of wage formation in the manufacturing sector (for example, Sachs 1979 and Hibbs 1977) show that, contrary to the situation in the United States, bursts of inflation have not in general affected adversely the real wage of British manufacturing workers. The power of British trade unions and other institutional arrangements in the labor market has effectively insulated the real wage from inflation shocks. Apparently inflation also has not been painful for state pensioners, that is, for the lower-income aged. Since 1975 national retirement pensions in Britain have been formally indexed, and data for prior years indicate that over the entire postwar period, the real value of pensions was maintained, or actually increased, during years of high inflation (Piachaud 1978) . On the other hand, studies by Muellbauer (1974) and others suggest that once differences in expenditure patterns are taken into account, the pricelevel increases experienced since the 1950s by lower-income groups as a whole typically were greater than those experienced by higher income groups.
As I noted earlier, although it is difficult to reach unambiguous conclusions about the singular impact of inflation on social groups, considered jointly, the evidence on the incidence and distributional consequences of inflation and unemployment implies strongly that lower status groups are likely to exhibit greater aversion to unemployment and less concern about inflation than higher status groups. The survey data reported in Figure 2 on sensitivity to unemployment among occupational groups (social grades) provide some evidence favoring this expectation, although, of course, only the May 1975 survey question pertains to concern about unemployment relative to inflation. ' Notice that in the surveys skilled workers typically express somewhat greater concern about unemployment than the social grade that includes semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Even though the evidence reviewed earlier shows that semiskilled and unskilled workers experience considerably higher unemployment rates than all other occupational groups, the lowest social-grade category in the published survey reports also includes widows and state pensioners who are outside the labor force and therefore presumably not affected directly by unemployment.
The electorate's preferences and their objective economic interests in macroeconomic issues and outcomes appear to be class-related. Nonetheless, most earlier time-series studies of economic influences on political support have been based solely on aggregate survey data. (See note 2.) Therefore, in order to investigate the sources and magnitudes of differences in group responses to economic events within the framework of a dynamic model of a government's political support, time-series analyses were undertaken in which the relative importance (regression weights) attached to the economic performance variables are allowed to vary across occupational classes. Occupation of the household's primary wage earner was selected as the dimension of disaggregation because of its relevance to the distributional issues reviewed earlier and, more important, because even though class voting is believed by many specialists to have declined somewhat in Britain, occupational position remains the preeminent source of persistent partisan voting cleavages (Franklin and Mughan 1978).
The second section of this paper describes a theory of how people make qualitative political choices, which formalizes the idea that survey responses concerning voters' party preferences are discrete reflections of underlying, continuously valued sentiments that range from strongly positive to strongly negative. The two most important substantive features of the theoretical 7Unfortunately the opinion polls chronically confuse the "cost of living" with "rising prices," that is, the price level and standards of living with the inflation rate. Therefore, data from many surveys cannot be used to assess the public's relative concern about inflation. The concluding section develops the electoral implications of the results of the estimation by computing the changes in support for the governing party to be expected from reasonable movements in the macroeconomic performance variables. This section also develops a novel interpretation of trends in class-based political support for the parties, which suggests that the argument that there has been a persistent pattern of class dealignment in the 1960s and 1970s is erroneous. Political opinion surveys typically force people to make discrete, qualitative responses. In the present case, the survey measure of popular support for the principal governing party (Labour or the Conservatives) is based on the Gallup Poll question for Great Britain "If there were a General Election tomorrow, how would you vote?" In principle, however, support for the governing party is not a strictly discrete phenomenon but a matter of degree, and therefore it is more accurately viewed as falling on an underlying continuum ranging from strongly positive to strongly negative. As Appendix 1 shows, a reasonable approximation to such a continuously valued support index (Y*j,) is the natural logarithm of the proportion (of the jth group) of the survey sample at each time period expressing support for the governing party (P'j,) divided by one minus this proportion (l-P'j,). That is, ln[P'j,1 (1-P'1j,)J. P'tl l-P', gives the support odds ratio, and the natural logarithm of this odds ratio, known as the logit, ranges from -oo to + oo. The logits constitute the continuously valued support index used in the regression analyses discussed in the next section.
Several features of the political support model in equation (1) should be understood. First, the governing party's political support depends on its cumulative performance record with respect to the variables Z. However, since the present relevance of the information conveyed by past performance decays over time, the weights given to past performance outcomes (Zt-k) in the model decline at rate gk, where g is a decay-rate parameter lying between zero and one. Zt-k is a vector of economic performance outcomes experienced k periods ago (k = 0,1,2,3, . . .) and therefore current and past experiences with respect to Z are weighted g0Z, = Zt, gZ, l, g2Z42, g3Zt-3, .... Of course the electorate need not discount past performance outcomes in exactly this way. As long as voters weight recent performance outcomes more heavily than prior outcomes when making current political evaluations, the geometric weight sequence gk will yield a good approximation of the actual behavioral process.
Moreover, this feature of the model can be tested. If, on average, voters in a particular group discount past performance completely and consider only the current situation when evaluating the government, then the estimate of g will approximate zero. Small, nonzero values of g mean that voters discount the past record heavily but not completely. Large values of g (approaching 1.0) imply that past-performance outcomes play an important role in explaining a government's current political support. Clearly then, g is an interesting parameter from a political point of view; it summarizes how much the past performance
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The American Political Science Review Vol. 76 record contributes to current support for the governing party and it defines in the way described below whether, typically, the government's economic record is judged absolutely or relatively. The second feature of the model that should be described is the way in which support for the governing party depends on that party's relative performance record. The product of the binary, switching terms DtDtk in equation (1) Of course if the current government's performance is more favorable than that of earlier opposition-party governments, this trend will be reversed. Conversely, the trend of declining support will be accelerated if the government's performance is less favorable than the situation inherited from the opposition. Support will eventually converge to the equilibrium level implied by any sustained performance record. The important point is that the model of equation (1) Table 2 yield no evidence of a decline over time in fundamental class loyalties. The data most relevant to the class dealignment argument appear in the first two columns of Table  2 , which show the intercept differences for nonmanual versus semi-skilled and unskilled workers and the differences for nonmanual versus skilled workers. The data in the first column (nonmanual versus semi-skilled and unskilled workers) indicate that from the Macmillan-Home to the Wilson I and Heath governments, there indeed appears to have been some decline in exogenous class-based political loyalties. The cross-occupational intercept differences decrease from 1.3 to approximately 1.2, but as the data over governments and time in Table 2 Table 2 is the apparent downward movement in the intercept differences between skilled workers and semi-skilled and unskilled workers. If the estimates in fact register a systematic pattern in the class-induced political behavior of skilled and unskilled workers over time (third column), the trend implies increasing homogeneity of workingclass political loyalties rather than class-party dealignment.
The time-weighted averages (of the absolute values) of the intercept differences are reported at the bottom of putations in Table 2 suggested that these trends are not accounted for by movements in fundamental class alignments, that is, by class-based loyalties unrelated to the parties' economic performance. Therefore, the explanation for oscillations in class-related political allegiances observed directly in the raw poll data must reside at least partly in the differential responses of occupational groups to trends in the macroeconomy, in particular to the poor economic performance of Britain in recent years. I will return to this important point.
The Lag Weight Rate of Decay Parameter
As the earlier discussion of the model indicated, the lag weight parameter g in the equations defines the electorate's effective memory with respect to prior economic performance outcomes or, equivalently, the rate at which prior experience is discounted when voters make contemporaneous political judgments.'8 When g is zero, or nearly so, the political support equations collapse to a static model used in much of the existing empirical work, which implies that only current economic outcomes affect the governing party's political support. 19 The estimates of g in Table 1 range from 0.85 to 0.88, indicating that the politically relevant memory of past economic performance is roughly homogenous across occupational classes and extends many periods back in time. Hence, the assumption in the equations that political support is based on cumulative, relative performance is not merely an appealing theoretical fiction. Assuming g to be less than 0.85 to 0.88 would yield inferior predictions of fluctuations in the political support data.
Recall that if an economic performance variable, Z, is held at some equilibrium value Z* indefinitely, the ultimate impact is Z* b(z)I(1-g), where b(z) is the contemporaneous impact of Z estimated by the relevant regression coefficient in Table 1 . The proportion of the total impact of a sustained movement in Z felt by the kth lag is given by 1-gk+l. Therefore, for an average g of 0.87, only about 13 percent of the ultimate impact of a sustained movement in economic performance is felt contemporaneously, 42 percent is felt after one year (4 quarters), 67 percent after two years (8 quarters) and approximately 94 percent is felt after five years (20 quarters). Hence, only at the very end of a full five-year electoral period is a government evaluated almost entirely on its own past performance record. Earlier in the electoral period, the government's record is evaluated relative to that of previous governments in the way indicated by equations (1) and (2). It is clear, then, '8If the distributed lag equations were written as backward discount functions with weights 1/(1+r)k, as opposed to voter memory functions with weights gk, estimates of the discount rate r would simply be equal to (l-g)Ig.
'I9 In their study of the governing party's lead in the polls, Frey and Schneider (1978) report estimates for a model including a lagged endogenous (dependent) variable among the regressors to capture distributed lag effects. This specification directly implies a distributed lag in which support for the incumbent party is influenced by its own performance and the performance of previous opposition party governments in the same way. Since it is implausible, for example, that an acceleration of prices under a Labour government would produce declines in support for a subsequent Conservative government, it is unlikely that such an equation conveys accurate information about the dynamics of political support. that although voters discount prior economic outcomes, the electorate is not nearly as myopic as strong versions of political business cycle theories imply.20 Surely a government that made economic policy under the mistaken belief that voters' electoral decisions were based only on the economic performance of the most recent year or half-year would be miscalculating seriously.
Macroeconomic Performance
As I emphasized earlier, it is natural to expect political responses to macroeconomic performance to vary across occupational classes because the incidence and distributional impact of fluctuations in economic conditions are not distributed uniformly through the class structure. In particular, this is true of the economy's real performance as the parameter estimates for the unemployment and real income variables show.
The coefficients for the rate of unemployment (U) vary sharply across groups. The political support of nonmanual, white-collar employees exhibits substantially less sensitivity to the unemployment level than the political support of manual blue-collar workers.2" Among manual workers, the estimates indicate that the skilled occupational grade is more averse to unemployment than the semi-skilled and unskilled group, but this finding undoubtedly reflects the fact that the latter category also includes widows and state pensioners who are outside the labor force and therefore are not affected directly by the tightness of labor markets. Had disaggregated time-series survey data been readily available on the party preferences of semi-skilled and unskilled workers alone, the unemployment coefficient for this occupational class probably would have been larger (negative) than that of the skilled workers, because as the earlier discussion indicated, the unskilled typically are more exposed to unemployment.
Nonetheless, the parameter estimate of percentage changes in the rate of unemployment, (lnU,/ U, ) X 400, is significant only for social grades DE. Since we know that the incidence of unem20This observation is also true of the American electorate. In other articles I showg to be in the 0.8 to 0.9 range for the United States (Hibbs 1982a, b) . 21 To conserve space I have not reported pooled results in which all parameters (except the intercepts) are assumed to be common across groups. However, the null hypothesis that there is no variability in parameters across groups is rejected at virtually any test level. The results of the regression estimation for the growth rate of per-capita real personal disposable income parallel the results for the rate of unemployment, which undoubtedly is not coincidental since both variables measure performance of the real macroeconomy. Again, nonmanual whitecollar employees exhibit less sensitivity to the percapita real income growth rate than either of the manual groups, and, as in the case of the results for the unemployment rate, the political support of skilled workers is more responsive than the support of the lowest social grade to real income movements. It is unlikely that the economic wellbeing of semi-skilled and unskilled workers is less sensitive to aggregate income fluctuations than skilled workers, and so the coefficient estimate for social grade DE probably reflects the fact that the income stream of widows and state pensioners depends on government transfer policies unrelated to movements in other sources of aggregate disposable income.
Over the long run, changes in the exchange rate EXR, -EXR,1 register Britain's relative international inflation performance, although more recently the demand for sterling associated with the flow of North Sea oil has also been an important factor. However, from a domestic political point of view, the dollars-per-pound rate of exchange appears to have been interpreted by the public as an index of British prestige, which is one of the reasons that the first Wilson government resisted for so long the devaluation that ultimately proved necessary in late 1967. Before the demise of pegged exchange rates in 1971, this was the only sizeable postwar movement in the pound's rate of exchange, and it was followed by a substantial decline in the government's support in the polls. The parameter estimates in Table 1 suggest that manual workers, particularly skilled manual workers, were somewhat more sensitive to movements in the international status of sterling than 22The next section gives precise calculations of the comparative impact of the economic variables in terms of percentage points in the political support polls. other groups, but there is no obvious explanation for this.23
Inflation, however, is the more enduring index of nominal economic performance, and its impact on political support has a more straightforward interpretation. In most of the regression experiments, estimates for the impact of the inflation rate P, were negligible, and therefore only the rate of price acceleration P. -P. 1 appears in Table 1 . This finding implies that the British electorate is not averse to inflation per se, but that sudden changes in the inflation rate (accelerations and decelerations of prices) have important political consequences. Since the first difference of the inflation rate is a reasonable (though simple) measure of inflationary surprises,24 the significant coefficients for the Pt -P-,l are very small, which is consistent with evidence discussed earlier indicating that the distributional consequences of inflationary bursts are not sharply stratified along class lines. Viewed in relation to the results for the unemployment rate, however, the picture changes dramatically.
Since recent studies by economists suggest that the relevant macroeconomic trade-off is between the rate of change of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, it is economically, as well as politically, informative to examine the relative magnitude of the associated regression coefficients across occupational classes. The ratios of the U and Pt -P., parameter estimates yield the marginal rates of substitution (MRS); that is, the implicit rates at which voters are willing to substitute price acceleration for unemployment. 
Occupational Class

Implications for Electoral Change and Class Dealignment
The regression coefficient estimates in Table 1 where F is the logistic distribution function, F(Z) = exp(Z)/1 + exp(Z); F-is the inverse logistic, F-1 (P) = ln[P'/(1-P')]; P'RI is the mean support proportion for government q in group j; k is the number of periods during which the change in the economy is sustained (4, 8, indefinitely); and AZ is the magnitude of the increase in the macroeconomic variables. 26 Given the values of the memory parameter g, "indefinitely" essentially means five to six years. Since it makes no sense to imagine price accelerations, exchange rate appreciations, and percentage unemployment rate increases lasting this long, such computations were not made for those variables. ciated with a strengthening pound (which I think is more likely), is ambiguous without more information about how the electorate interprets changes in the international standing of sterling. By contrast, the political effects of a twopercentage-point increase in the growth rate of per-capita real disposable income are quite modest. (The average growth rate during the sample period was only 2.6 percent, and so this experiment represents a sizeable increase in the real income growth rate stream.) Even when this favorable change in the real growth rate is sustained indefinitely, which practically speaking means five to six years, the mean increases of electoral support for the governing party range only from 1.1 to 2.6 percentage points. The greater relative sensitivity of working-class voters to real economic performance is nonetheless evident; the mean political responses of manual workers are typically between two and two and one-half times greater than the responses of non-manual employees.
Responses to an increase of two percent in the unemployment rate also exhibit sharp class cleavages, and the magnitudes are relatively large. Sustained for only four quarters, the mean responses range between -1.3 and -3.2 percentage points for nonmanual employees and skilled workers, respectively. An increase of this magnitude in unemployment which lasts indefinitely depresses mean political support between 3.1 percentage points and 6.6 percentage points, where again, nonmanual white-collar employees show the smallest average response. The mean politicalsupport losses following an increase in the rate of change of the inflation rate of two percent are of comparable magnitude, ranging between -3.4 and -3.8 percentage points if sustained for eight quarters. However, as the earlier MRS calculations illustrated, the principal cleavages are between the class responses to inflation acceleration relative to the class responses to increased unemployment.
The discussion thus far has focused on the mean political responses of occupational classes to changes in the macroeconomic variables, that is, on the responses averaged over all governments. Notice in Table 3 , however, that gains and losses of political support for Labour and Conservative governments deviate significantly from the corresponding mean political support changes. The cross-party variations depend on the proximity of each occupational group's baseline political support proportion (P',) to 0.5. P', = 0.5 implies that individuals will support the governing party with probability 0.5; in other words, the odds of support are 50/50. Hence, at P', = 0.5, changes in the macroeconomy yield relatively large shifts in political support because individuals (groups) are pushed across the threshold of opinion change.7 By contrast, at P', = 0.2, for example, the shift in political support after the same change in the macroeconomy will be smaller because voters are further from the 0.5 critical threshold.
Since exogenous political loyalties anchor working-class voters close to a political-support baseline of 0.5 for Labour governments, and anchor middle-class voters close to a political support baseline of 0.5 for Conservative governments, shifts in the political support of occupational classes after macroeconomic changes are not homogeneous across party governments. Consequently, working-class political support is more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions during Labour than during Conservative administrations. And just the reverse is true for middle-class political support; support for the governing party among nonmanual voters is more responsive to economic outcomes when the Conservatives are in power. Moreover, the coefficients of unemployment and real-income growth are significantly larger in absolute value for manual, working-class voters than for nonmanual, middle-class voters. As a result, during Labour governments, exogenous political loyalties interact with these classrelated coefficient differences to produce class dealignment of political support in periods of deteriorating real economic performance.
This Note also that the instantaneous marginal response of P-to a marginal change in Z (the derivative, dP't/dZ) is P'jt(l-P' t) * b/, which takes its maximum value at P',t = 0.5. F or further discussion, see Kernell and Hibbs (1981). Table 1 Finally, it should be emphasized that the data and conclusions presented here pertain to the reported vote intentions of occupational classes and not to party identification or other conceptions of partisan attachments.
